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ABSTRAG
This paper offers an analysis of scientific creativity based on theoretical
models and experimental results of the cognitive sciences. Its core idea is that
scientific creativity -like other forms of creativity - is structured and constrained
by prior ontological expectations. Analogies provide scientists with a powerful
epistemic tool to overcome these constraints. While current research on analo-
gies in scientific understanding focuses on near analogies, where target and source
domain are close, we argue that distant analogies - where target and source
domain differ widely - are especially useful in periods of intense conceptual
change. To argue this point, we discuss three case studies from the history of
science: early physiologists like Harvey, early evolutionary biologists like Darwin,
and recent theorists on the evolution of the human mind like Mithen.
INTRODUGION
What mechanisms underlie scientific creativity; what enables scientists to
make significant contributions to their disciplines? The quest by philosophers of
science for some rationale behind scientific discovery and creativity has been
recently joined by cognitive scientists (e.g., Simonton, 2003). Both examine
what guides the scientific process and in what ways it resembles or differs from
ordinary, everyday thought. Experimental psychological studies suggest that
creativity is not unconstrained and limitless but structured by prior assumptions
(Ward et al., 2002). Given that scientists are subject to the same cognitive limita-
tions as other people, we argue that scientific creativity is likewise structured and
constrained by prior expectations. Still, the occurrence of scientific innovations
. (on the level of the individual scientist) or of paradigm shifts (on the level of the
scientific community) clearly indicates that scientists are able to overcome these
constraining factors.
;- Whereas the focus of recent research on scientific creativity has been on near
analogies (e.g., Dunbar, 1997), we show that distant analogies playa role in the
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scientific creative process, especially in periods of intense conceptual change. In
our view, distant analogies constitute epistemic actions, which render problems
more tractable by replacing the unfamiliar conceptual space of the target
domain by a more familiar and therefore more congenial source domain. We
start out with a survey of structured imagination in everyday cognition, and the
role of intuitive ontologies. We then examine how people overcome the constrain-
ing effects of intuitive assumptions by distant analogies that apply the structure
of one domain onto a different target domain. Finally, we provide three examples
from the history of science to illustrate that analogies from widely diverging
domains play an important role in scientific creativity.
STRuaURED IMAGINATION
Creativity Is Structured
In his seminal study, Ward (1994) asked college students to imagine extra-
terrestrial animals. Their creations possessed characteristic attributes of Earth
animals, such as sense organs, legs and bilateral symmetry. In one follow-up study
(Ward et aI., 2002), subjects were asked to imagine tools that might be used by a
highly intelligent species of extraterrestrials, with the following two constraints:
the tools are not to be operated by power sources, and the creatures are not to
have arms, legs or other appendages comparable to Earth animals. Despite these
constraints, most participants relied on typical tools, such as hammers, saws and
wrenches that were only slightly modified to allow the creatures to wrap them
around their heads or hold them in their mouths. Subsequent interviews with the
subjects revealed that a large majority heavily relied on specific examples of ani-
mal~ and tools to guide their creative process. The tendency to rely on existing
knowledge as a guide to creativity is termed structured imagination (Ward, 1994).
This finding has been replicated in many studies, even in children as young as
five years of age (Cacciari, Levorato & Cicogna, 1997).
Creativity in more natural settings displays the same pattern of structured
imagination. Religious ideas do not exhibit an unlimited cultural variability, but
are constrained by prior ontological expectations. As Boyer (2001) already
observed, there are no gods that only exist on Wednesdays. Religious concepts
only exhibit minimal deviations from ordinary categories. Thus, gods and other
supernatural agents are invariably conceptualized as having desires, emotions
and intentions; they conform to a normal belief-desire psychology. What makes
them exceptional is their minimal violation of category-based expectations, such
as ghosts walking through walls (agents with a normal belief-desire psychology
who nevertheless violate physical expectations). Barrett and Keil (1996) found
that Christian believers have difficulties representing their god consistently as an
omniscient, omnipresent being: they intuitively distort stories about him to fit
expectations they have of normal people, such as that he can only attend to one
event at the same time. The historian of technology Basalla (1988) has amply
demonstrated that newly invented devices are nearly always based on existing
artifacts. This is why archaeologists (e.g., O'Brien & Lyman, 2000) can study tfr
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evolution of artifacts as if they were organisms, using the same methods as
paleontologists who study the origins, gradual morphological changes and
extinctions of biological species. Product design works by tinkering, not by
radical restructuring, which is not always advantageous: the tendency of design
engineers to pattern new devices after earlier solutions often leads to suboptimal
designs (Jansson, Condoor & Brock, 1993).
Intuitive Ontologies
The discussion above shows that existing conceptual spaces constrain creativ-
ity to an important extent, but it is less clear from where these conceptual spaces
originate. A growing number of studies in cognitive anthropology (e.g., Boyer,
2000) and neuroscience (e.g., Caramazza & Mahon, 2003) suggest that the way
humans parse the world is not arbitrary or even solely governed by external real-
ity, but rather that our inductive inferences rely on intuitive ontologies - a limited
set of category-based evolved expectations that emerge early in development
and that guide our reasoning about physical, psychological and biological phe-
nomena. Ontology is the philosophical study of what is, i.e., what kinds of entities
there are in the world, and how different categories of entities are related to each
other. The question of how particular objects relate to universal properties is an
ontological question (say, a particular cat and cats as a species). Human cat-
egory-based inference mechanisms are ontologies in the sense that they provide
a set of expectations of how specific kinds of objects willbehave - they are termed
intuitive because they are not the product of deliberate reflection or scientific
investigation. Examples of intuitive ontologies include folk psychology (expecta-
tions of how agents will behave), folk physics (inferences of how inanimate
objects move) and intuitive biology (expectations of how livings things behave
and develop).
Intuitive ontologies are often associated with computationally complex sur-
/vival problems, including finding food, avoiding predators and handling tools.
Rapid and efficient identification and reasoning about them have significant
survival and reproductive advantages. New, Cosmides and Tooby (2007), for
example, demonstrated that subjects are substantially faster and more accurate
at detecting changes in complex scenery when animals (e.g., pigeons) were
introduced or omitted compared to inanimate objects, even vehicles, which they
have been trained for years to monitor for sudden life-or-death situations in traffic.
As this efficiency could not be accounted for by differences in lower-level visual
characteristics or expertise, the authors assumed that people might have an
advantage in animal categorization by virtue of the iincestral importance of this
ability, regardless of its current utility. Based on the existing literature, to date the
best candidates for intuitive ontologies include animal, plant, artifact, person and
body part (see Capitani et aI., 2003, for an overview). Each of these domains
contains a distinct set of assumptions, which means that inductive inferences
made for objects belonging to one domain cannot be transferred to another.
Neuropsychological studies (e.g., Farah & Rabinowitz, 2003) indeed indicate that
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patients with focal brain injury sometimes lose the ability to reason about
anirrals and plants (e.g., they forget the names of plants and animals and cannot
answer questions like "do eagles lay eggs"), while their knowledge of artifacts
remains intact. In contrast, some patients with semantic dementia forget what
artifacts are for (e.g., "is a pencil for writing or eating"), while their knowledge of
animals and plants remains excellent (Capitani et aI., 2003). As imagination about
organisms and tools is structured by intuitive ontologies about these domains,
this likely limits the scope of our creativity, as can be gleaned from the studies on
imagining extraterrestrials and their toolkit. It seems highly unlikely that our
evolved cognitive capacities would be widely off the mark (Quine, 1969). Never-
theless, there are indications that intuitive ontologies are built for speed rather
than accuracy. In many cases, laypeople and children are satisfied with shallow
accounts that are not explanations at all, as in the case of teleological explana-
tions (e.g., eyes are there so that we can see, rain exists so that plants can grow),
where the function is seen as a necessary and sufficient explanation of the
structure under consideration (Lombrozo & Carey, 2006).
Analogies in Everyday Creative Thought
How do we overcome the constraints of conceptual structures while being
creative? Neuropsychological research suggests that creativity does not depend
on a single cognitive process or mechanism, but rather on the interaction of sev-
eral cognitive processes (Vartanian & Goel, 2007). Indeed, a variety of cognitive
mechanisms underlie creativity, such as analogical and metaphorical reasoning
or conceptual combination. In this paper we will focus on analogical reasoning,
our ability to understand new observations or concepts by mapping the structure
of existing domains onto them (Gentner, 1983), like Niels Bohr's analogy
between the structure of an atom (target domain) and the structure of the solar
system (source domain), the well-known orbital model. Analogies can be consid-
ered as epistemic actions: they are performed to gain insight into a problem,
which turned out to be impossible through an exploration of the original concep-
tual space. In contrast to pragmatic actions, which are performed to alter the
world because of some intended physical change (e.g., driving from home
to work), epistemic actions (e.g., driving around in order to explore one's new
neighborhood after moving) are mainly performed to aid and augment cognitive
processes (Kirsh, 1996). Analogies enhance our cognitive processes as they widen
or alter the conceptual space in which problems are phrased.
INTUITIVE ONTOLOGIES AND SCIENTIFIC CREATIVITY
Intelligibility
Dear (2006) has argued that modern science comes in two distinguishable
guises: instrumentality, or usefulness, and intelligibility,or providing accounts of
how 'things really are'. These two components together foster a profound trust in
modern science. Why is science efficient? Because it is true. How do we know
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that scientific beliefs are true? By virtue of their effective instrumental capacities.
It is a circular argument, but invisibly so. Of these two guises, intelligibility plays
an important part, because science has taken over the role of natural philosophy
to account for natural phenomena not just in ways that are internally consistent,
but that somehow seem right, make sense or feel intuitively true. De Regt and
Dieks (2005) claim that understanding constitutes the main epistemic aim of
science. They contrast science with a hypothetical oracle, whose predictions al-
ways turn out to be true. Although in this case empirical adequacy is ensured, we
do not speak of a great scientific success since we cannot understand how these
perfect predictions are brought about. Scientists clearly want more: they want to
grasp how predictions are made, and develop a feeling for the consequences of
theories in concrete situations. Indeed, in the history of science, approaches were
rarely pursued on the basis of instrumental effectiveness alone. Children and
laypeople sometimes resist scientific ideas that they find unintelligible, because
their evolved cognitive architecture cannot adequately deal with them (Bloom &
Weisberg, 2007). For example, children have the useful belief that unsupported
objects fall downward, but this makes it difficult for them to conceptualize the
world as a sphere. As a result, children create hybrid models of the world that
match their intuitive understanding of physical phenomena, but that also con-
form to the spherical view of our planet, such as a hollow sphere or a disc-shaped
earth (Vosniadou, Skopeliti & Ikospentaki, 2004).
The effects of intuitive ontologies are not restricted to children: they linger in
educated adults. In the case of intuitive physics, even physics students continue
to apply the wrong but internally consistent impetus theory to predict the out-
come of physical events. For example, they erroneously predict that a ball that is
being swung in a circular path will continue to fly in a circular trajectory (Uu &
Macisaac, 2005). Intuitive ontologies may also playa role in scientific understand-
ing. Cross-culturally, people hold the intuitive belief that humans are fundamen-
tally different from all other animals (Anggoro, Waxman & Medin, 2005).
Paleoanthropologists and archaeologists, who are not immune to this, indeed
often invoke exceptional mechanisms for human evolution (De Cruz & De Smedt,
2007). Our intuitive ontologies lead us to perceive some accounts as more intel-
ligible and more epistemologically satisfying than others. Given that one of the
most important aims of science is to make nature intelligible, we can expect that
intuitive ontologies will continue to playa role in scientific understanding.
Analogies and Scientific Creativity
Case studies from the history of science and field studies of scientists at work
indicate that scientific creativity draws on the same cognitive resources as every-
day creativity (Simonton, 2003). Scientists often resort to analogies. It is useful
at this point to draw a distinction between near and distant analogies. A near
analogy is one in which target and source come from the same or a closely re-
lated domain. In a distant analogy, target and source come from widely diverging
domains. Early work on scientific creativity tended to focus on distant analogies,
,. 33
Science as Structured Imagination
such as the snake analogy mentioned by Kekule in his discovery of the benzene
ring, or Rutherford's comparison between the structure of our solar system and
that of an atom (the planetary model). Yet, upon closer scrutiny, it turned out that
these analogies were not crucial in these discoveries. A fundamental difficulty of
the research on historical scientific creativity is that one has to rely on retrospec-
tive accounts, written years or even decades after the discovery was made. It is
only in rare instances (such as Darwin's notebooks) that written documents pro-
vide a reflection of the creative process in progress. Despite these limitations,
which apply to any examination of historical material, the use of non-superficial
analogies is well established both in scientists at work and in laypeople (Dunbar
& Blanchette 2001). Thus it seems plausible that written records provide an
(albeit incomplete) record of analogical reasoning.
Current studies suggest that scientists mainly work within the bounds of
their conceptual structures. Dunbar (1997) studied creative scientific thought in
action in molecular biological labs. He found that near analogies form the most
important source of creative insight, such as the analogy from a well-understood
virus to a lesser-understood virus to predict how it would behave in specific
circumstances. In contrast, distant analogies were rare and served explanatory
purposes, rather than epistemic ones. For example, one molecular biologist
likened a polymerase chain reaction to the well-known analogy that a group of
monkeys equipped with typewriters, given enough time, willtype a sentence from
Hamlet. Dunbar (1997, p. 488) therefore concludes that "creative ideas and
novel concepts arise through a series of small changes produced by a variety of
cognitive mechanisms ... Conceptual change, like evolutionary change, is the
result of tinkering."
The central role of near analogies accords well with classical accounts of sci-
entific discovery, which suggest that the bulk of scientific work takes place within
the bounds of existing well-delineated conceptual structures (e.g., Lakatos, 1978).
Scientific imagination, like everyday creativity, is structured. Most of scientific
progress takes place in mental hops, rather than leaps (to use the terminology
of Ward, 1998). In other words, most scientific creativity exhibits relatively little
deviation from the source domain, and preserves most of the properties. What
role then do distant analogies play in scientific discovery if near analogies alone
can explain scientific progress? The molecular biologists Dunbar (1997) investi-
gated could draw on a wealth of well-understood mechanisms and observations.
But this is not the case for scientists working in new domains where near analo-
gies are unavailable. We propose that in these instances, distant analogies can
and do playa vital role.
Take Kepler, who attempted to explain why planets further from the Sun moved
more slowly within the then new heliocentric Copernican model. Discarding the
ancient idea that planets moved fixed on heavenly spheres, he introduced the
concept of vis motrix, a precursor of gravity. To explain this concept, he drew on
an analogy with light. The source domain of optics was fruitful because optical
phenomena were better understood than the solar system:
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Let us suppose then [... 1 that motion is dispensed by the Sun in the same
proportion as light. Now the ratio in which light spreading out from a centre
is weakened is stated by the opticians. For the amount of light in a small
circle is the same as the amount of light or of the solar ray in the great one.
Hence, as it is more concentrated in the small circle, and more thinly spread
in the great one, the measure of this thinning out must be sought in the
actual ratio of the circles, both for light and for the moving power (Kepler,
Mysterium cosmographicum 1596, cited in Gentner et aI., 1997, p. 16).
Another example is Stanford and Iris Ovshinsky's invention of the threshold
switch (a successor to the transistor) by analogy of the human nerve cell. During
the early fifties, the Ovshinskys recognized that plasticity of the nerve cell's mem-
brane plays a crucial role in the neuronal basis of human learning. Based on their
observations, they created a thin film of amorphous disordered material as the
analogue of the cell membrane, and used this mechanical analogue to create the
threshold switch. During this research, the Ovshinskys ventured into a radically
new domain of science, that of amorphous disordered materials, whereas other
scientists working in the domain of semiconductors still focused exclusively on
crystalline materials. The creative use of distant analogy in this scientific process
is plausible, since Stanford Ovshinsky had a keen interest in the neurophysiology
of mammals, artificial intelligence and cybernetics, and actively corresponded
with scientists working in these fields (Hoddeson, 2007). These cases suggest
that distant analogies can playa role in periods of intense conceptual change or
in the invention of radically new technological devices, when scientists cannot
rely on established examples to draw near analogies from.
Because analogies are epistemic actions, performed to make problems more
tractable by mapping them onto existing conceptual spaces, we expect that the
source domain will be more familiar than the targetdomain, rather than the other
way around. For example, scientific knowledge on the human mind has only
seriously improved during the last 50 years with the advent of the cognitive revo-
lution, primarily driven by computer scientists, who attempted to construct a
robust science of intelligent behavior and behavioral biology. The structure and
functional properties of the human mind, and of animal minds in general, remain
as yet rather poorly understood. In contrast, our knowledge of how rigid objects
behave (mechanics) has been expanding steadily since Antiquity. Since the
human mind is less understood than mechanics, we should expect that mechani-
cal analogies for the human mind will be more fruitful in the context of scientific
discovery than vice versa (see section "The Evolution of the Human Mind").
DISTANT ANALOGIES AS A SOURCE OF CREATIVITY IN THE
EARLY STAGES OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT FORMATION
In scientific domains where formerly intuitive ontologies played an important
role, distant analogies may have been of crucial importance to move away from
well-trodden paths. In this section, we examine how the mapping of widely diverg-
ing source domains into target domains can foster conceptual change by three
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case-studies: Harvey's mechanical and weather analogies in early modern physi-
ology, Darwin's population biology and wedge analogies in evolutionary theory,
and the use of mechanical analogies in the understanding of the evolution of the
human mind by evolutionary psychologists and cognitive archaeologists.
Early Modern Physiology
A first example to illustrate how distant analogies can help us overcome intui-
tive ontologies is the use of mechanical analogies in early modern physiology.
Experimental psychological studies (e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 2004) show that
people are intuitive vitalists: they believe that vital power is taken from food and
water and enables living things to sustain themselves, grow and prevent illness.
Young children often explain the functions of internal organs in purely vitalistic
terms, e.g., the function of the heart is to sustain the life of its owner. Regardless
of their cultural background, up to the age of five, both Australian and Japanese
children prefer vitalistic over mechanistic explanations of bodily functions (Mor-
ris, Taplin & Gelman, 2000). This vitalistic stance is also found in the work of
ancient physicians. Claudius Galenus of Pergamum (2nd century AD) made sig-
nificant contributions to our knowledge of blood circulation by dissecting ani-
mals. He studied the movements of the heart, the action of the valves and the
pulsative force of the arteries. According to Galen, there are two kinds of blood:
the dark type, found in the venous system, served as nutrition of the body. The
lighter type, found in the arterial system, carried blood that was abundant in vital
spirits. However, he failed to describe human circulation, which involves the tran-
sit of blood from the right to the left ventricle through the lungs (Khan, Daya &
Gowda, 2005).
It was only in the early 17th century that the precise dynamics of circulation
were discovered. Prior to the 16th century, internal organs were still mainly under-
stood in vitalistic terms. The Renaissance revival of ancient texts included trea-
tises on mechanics, such as Vitruvius' De architectura (ca. 25 BC), which
contained accounts of hydraulics and water pumping engines, next to Archimedes'
seminal works on mechanics. As a result, knowledge of hydraulics expanded rap-
idly during the early modern period, enabling the draining of the Low Countries.
This permitted cardiovascular physiologists of that time to draw from this well-
understood domain to unravel circulation, at that time poorly understood. The
Paduan anatomist Benedetti published a paper in 1502 on the action of the heart
valves, which he likened to unidirectional sluice gates in a canal: "three valves are
purposefully placed by nature like movable gates which by turns when the heart
is contracted in emitting blood do not completely shut off its passage, for these
valves close inward" (cited in Novell, 1990, p. 397). Another Paduan anatomist,
Aquapendente, compared the action of the venous valves to a dam or a mill sluice.
One of his pupils, William Harvey, used a variety of analogies to reason about
circulation. Although his idea that the heart was like a pair of water bellows (not a
pump, as is popularly assumed) was not novel, his colorful use of analogies,
often from the domains of mechanics or physics, enabled him to make a more
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precise formulation of how human blood circulated. In his lectures to the College
of Physicians, for example, he likened the mechanism of an erection to the infla-
tion of a glove, and the working of lungs and thorax to a bladder within a bellows.
Interestingly, the lectures are in Latin but many of these analogies are written out
in English. In one of his lecture notes he wrote "from the structure of the heart, it
is clear that the blood is constantly carried through the lungs into the aorta as by
two c1ackes [a kind of pump with one-way valves 1 of a water bellows to rays
water" (cited in Novell, 1990, p. 379). In De motu cordis, first published in 1628,
chapter 4, Harvey wonders why the ventricles and auricle contractions in the
mammal heart are so well-adapted to each other and responds with two mechani-
cal analogies: "Nor is this for any other reason than it is in a piece of machinery,
in which, though one wheel gives motion to another, yet all the wheels seem to
move simultaneously; or in that mechanical contrivance which is adapted to fire-
arms, where, the trigger being touched, down comes the flint, strikes against the
steel, elicits a spark, which falling among the powder, ignites it, when the flame
extends, enters the barrel, causes the explosion, propels the ball, and the mark
is attained - all of which incidents, by reason of the celerity with which they
happen, seem to take place in the twinkling of an eye".
In the preface of De motu cordis Harvey draws a microcosm-macrocosm anal-
ogy between the weather cycle as understood by Aristotle and the circulatory
system. This analogy, Gregory (2001) argues, was more than a simple rhetoric
device; it enabled Harvey to understand the difference between the two types of
blood, venous and arterial. Whereas this distinction did not pose a problem for
Galenic physicians who understood circulation mainly in vitalistic terms, it posed
a dilemma for Harvey who had to make the constant interconversion of the two
types of blood plausible. From what was known about anatomy at that time, Harvey
was unable to explain this, but the Aristotelian weather cycle provided an apt
analogy. According to Aristotle, qualitative and cyclical changes from water into
air and air into water could occur by evaporation and condensation. Just as the
sun in the macrocosm plays a causal role in this process, so does the heart con-
vert the blood in the microcosm by pumping it through the lungs. This analogy
permitted a closed system for circulation, whereas Galen's system, where the
heart consumes the blood, remained open. These analogies from mechanics and
physics enabled early modern anatomists to steer away from the intuitive vital-
ism that dominated early anatomical research. The idea that complex biological
systems can be represented in simple mechanical terms was a fundamental shift
in physiology, which remains important to this day. This shows how closely
related understanding and scientific creativity are: by using these mechanical
analogies, Harvey came to understand puzzling features of the human circula-
tory system, thereby enlarging medical knowledge.
Early Evolutionary Biology
Humans across cultures believe animals to possess a species-typical immu-
table 'essence' that guides their behavior and development. from the age of three,
children adopt an essentialist stance when reasoning about animals and plants,
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and even social categories. When one asks a four-year-old whether a kangaroo,
raised by goat foster parents, will hop or climb, the child correctly predicts that it,
will exhibit kangaroo-typical behavior (Ahn et aI., 2001). Intriguingly, children are
often more essentialist than adults. Five-year-olds believe that French babies
brought up by English-speaking parents will grow up to speak French (Gelman,
2004). This bias leads to similar folk taxonomies across the world, organized
on the basis of underlying species-typical essences rather than superficial
appearances (Atran, 1998). The widely held belief that species have unchanging
essences has long impeded evolutionary accounts that hold that species can
evolve into new species. Virtually all taxonomists prior to Darwin were species
essentialists and despite their expanding taxonomical knowledge, they made little
conceptual progress (Stamos, 2005). Essentialism is difficult to rhyme with the
view that species can evolve into different species, which may in part be respon-
sible for the enduring appeal of creationism and intelligent design. Indeed, even
children from non-religious families spontaneously come up with creationist
accounts for the origin of species (Evans, 2001).
The great innovation of Darwin and Wallace was to move away from this
essentialist stance by adopting population thinking, where species are not
idealized classes of entities, but groups of individuals that differ in their ability to
survive and reproduce. Population thinking is an analogy that applies Malthus'
theory of human population dynamics to organisms in general. In brief, Malthus
(in An essay on the principle of population, first published in 1798) reasoned
that food resources increased more slowly than population growth. Generalizing
this observation to organisms in general, Darwin realized that animals and plants
too have greater reproductive potential than available resources allow. As a
result, organisms will compete for the same resources, and hence heritable traits
that are advantageous will spread in the population, because their bearers will
outcompete those that do not possess them. In the introduction to the Origin of
species, Darwin (1859, p. 5) made his use of this analogy explicit. Likewise, in his
autobiography, Wallace, co-discoverer of the principle of natural selection, stated
explicitly that he would never have hit upon his theory were it not for reading
Malthus (Wallace, 1905, p. 240, 360). Prior to these authors, biologists did not
notice populations but focused on individuals. Unnaeus and others made stan-
dard idealized descriptions of species of animals and plants, such as 'the daisy',
'the honeybee'. It seems remarkable that taxonomists should have overlooked
the individual variation within species, given that they studied dozens of speci-
mens before making a detailed description of a given species. Yet well into the
19th century, virtually all biologists were essentialists. This led pre-Darwinian tax-
onomists to ignore or downplay the natural variability that species exhibit. Our
intuitive essentialism privileges the underlying hidden essence of an organism,
not its outward appearance. The skillful use of distant analogies enabled Darwin
and Wallace to overcome these intuitive ontological assumptions.
Darwin struggled to understand how this Malthusian population pressure could
result in evolutionary change (Millman & Smith, 1997). At first, he found it hard
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to envisage how "a multiplication of little means" could bring about the great
effect of evolutionary change. To get a better grasp, he used the mechanical
analogy of the wedge:
there is a force like a hundred thousand wedges trying to force every kind of
adapted structure into the gaps in the reconomy of nature, or rather form-
ing gaps by thrusting out weaker ones. The final cause of all this wedgings,
must be to sort out proper structure & adapt it to change (Darwin, 1838).
The wedge analogy also appears in the first edition of the Origin of Species:
"The face of Nature may be compared to a yielding surface, with ten thousand
sharp wedges packed close together and driven inwards by incessant blows, some-
times one wedge being struck, and then another with greater force" (Darwin, 1859,
p. 67). Interestingly, Darwin dropped this analogy in subsequent editions; per-
haps because by then he had developed a nearer analogy, namely between natu-
ral and sexual selection (in the latter, the selective pressures are performed by
potential mates rather than the external environment). This editing process also
reveals an interesting interplay between analogies as epistemic and as explana-
tory tools: whereas in the notebook (not intended for publication), Darwin used
the wedge analogy in an epistemic context, he later adopted it as an explanatory
device, which was subsequently dropped in favor of a near analogy.
The Evolution of the Human Mind
Once the target domain becomes better understood, distant analogies lose
much of their epistemic usefulness and near analogies predominate. Indeed, an
analysis of historical case-studies on multiple analogies in evolutionary biology
(Shelley, 1999) reveals that near analogies, such as inferences from extant spe-
cies to extinct ones (e.g., from ungulates to horned dinosaurs) are more com-
mon than distant analogies. As we have seen in the case of Darwin, the latter are
largely restricted to the early stages of scientific creativity. Therefore, we expect
that distant analogies in contemporary scientific practice are mainly restricted to
areas of research that possess an as yet underexplored conceptual structure. One
candidate for such a domain is the evolution of the human mind. Despite impor-
tant advances in our understanding of how the human brain evolved, its evolu-
tionary origins remain as yet poorly understood. Thus, we can expect that authors
who propose models for this domain will resort to distant analogies. Cosmides
and Tooby's analogy of the Swiss army knife is a well-known distant analogy for
human cognition that maps the artifactual onto the psychological domain:
The mind is probably more like a Swiss army knife than an all-purpose blade:
competent in so many situations because it has a large number of compo-
nents - bottle opener, corkscrew, knife, toothpick, scissors - each of which is
welldesigned for solving a different problem (Cosmides &Tooby, 1994, p. 60).
According to them, there are sound evolutionary reasons to expect the human
mind to be made up of several dedicated domain-specific cognitive systems
as specialized systems are better at solving distinct problems than a single proc-
essor: "We have both cork-screws and cups because each solves a particular
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problem better than the other. It would be extremely difficult to open a bottle of
wine with a cup or to drink from a cork-screw" (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994, p. 58).
It remains to be seen whether these analogies were epistemic rather than merely
explanatory in nature. Nevertheless, although they were aware of nearer analo-
gies, such as multiple specialized cognitive systems in birds and primates pro-
posed by Sherry and Shacter (1987), they continued to draw analogies from the
artifactual domain, such as cognitive modules like 'elegant machines' (Cosmides
& Tooby, 1995 p. xiv).
The cognitive archaeologist Mithen's Prehistory of the Mind (1996) provides
a further illustration of the use of distant analogies for epistemic purposes in the
study of the evolution of the human mind. Mithen develops two elegant analo-
gies. One conceptualizes human evolution as a play, divided into different acts
(reminiscent of Shakespeare's analogy of human life as a play in As you like it);
it is mainly explanatory and organizational in nature. As Dunbar (1997) already
noted, distant analogies often serve purely explanatory purposes, and this seems
to be the case here: "Six million years [the period of human evolution since
the split between humans and chimpanzees] is a vast span of time. In order to
begin comprehend it, to grasp its salient pattern of events, it helps to think of
those events as constituting a play, the drama of our past" (Mithen, 1996, p. 17).
Accordingly, the book's chapters are organized into four acts, beginning with a
dimly lit empty stage, representing the as yet unknown last common ancestor of
humans and chimpanzees, and ending with a dramatic act representing the last
100,000 years, which sees the evolution of Homo sapiens, its expansion out of
Africa, the appearance of art and, finally, the emergence of agriculture.
More interesting for our discussion is the second distant analogy Mithen
develops, that of medieval church and cathedral architecture to understand how,
according to him, human cognition changed from domain-specific to domain-
general. This second analogy is much more crucial for Mithen's understanding,
as, by his own account (1996, p. 61) it played an important role in the develop-
ment of his theory of human evolution, which briefly stated claims that special-
ized domains of intuitive knowledge (in this paper referred to as intuitive ontologies)
merged in the course of human evolution. Mithen uses the different phases in
medieval architecture, with which he is familiar, as source domain to explain
features of the evolved human mind, an unfamiliar target domain.
During my summer vacations when a student Iworked on the excavation
of the medieval Benedictine Abbey of San Vincenzo in Molise, Italy. I super-
vised the investigation of a particularly complex building, known as the 'South
Church'. [ ... ] [W]e deduced that there had been five phases in all, spanning
the first 1,000 years AD and culminating in an elaborate multistory building
housing many of the precious relics of the Abbey. [... ] When I look at the
evidence about the modern mind provided by the psychologists [... ], I am
reminded of our work at the South Church at San Vincenzo - or indeed any
modern church or cathedral (Mithen, 1996, p. 61).
Mithen discerns three phases in the evolution of the human mind, which closely
correspond to three phases that are often distinguished in the history of
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individual churches or cathedrals. In the first phase, the mind is like a central
nave (as in the simple one-room churches in late classical and early medieval
times), without any specialized cognitive capacities. A second phase witnesses
the building of multiple 'chapels' of specialized cognitive capacities around this
nave, in close analogy to the building of chapels in Romanesque churches. These
include domain-specific capacities for reasoning about social life, artifacts and
natural history. Pursuing this distant analogy, Mithen argues that these domains
do not influence each other:
A critical design feature of these chapels is that their walls are thick and
almost impenetrable to sound from elsewhere in the cathedral. There is
no access between the chapels. In other words, knowledge about didfferent
behavioral domains cannot be combined together (Mithen, 1996, p. 69).
Hominids from this phase, such as Homo ergaster, cannot reason across
domains, which would explain why they did not make specialized tools, but rather
general-purpose tools such as handaxes. In other words, since the artifactual and
biological domains could not communicate, these hominids could not develop
specialized hunting tools. The third phase is marked by a partial demolition of the
separating walls between the distinct cognitive domains, so that information from
one domain can flow to others. Here, the analogy draws on the transition from
Romanesque to Gothic architecture, where the thick, heavy walls between the
chapels were replaced by thinner columns. The differences between the minds of
the second and the third phase are analogous to those between Romanesque
and the succeeding Gothic cathedrals.
In Gothic architecture sound and light emanating from different parts of
the cathedral can flow freely around the building unimpeded by the thick
heavy walls and low vaults one finds in Romanesque architecture. [... ]
Similarly, in the Phase 3 mental architecture, thoughts and knowledge gen-
erated by specialized intelligences can now flow freely around the mind [... ]
[T]he result is an almost limitless capacity for imagination. So we should refer
to these Phase 3 minds as having a 'cognitive fluidity' (Mithen, 1996, p. 71).
Cognitive fluidity is exemplified in animism (endowing inanimate objects with
a desire-belief psychology), totemism (merging social and biological domains by
making animals ancestors to current human groups) and anthropomorphism
(endowing animals with human properties). According to Mithen, this third phase
started about 60,000 years ago, when we see the first material evidence for across-
domain reasoning, including specialized hunting tools which reveal a cross-fertili-
zation of natural history knowledge and technology (e.g., harpoons for specialized
fish capturing), and the emergence of therianthropes in art (half-human, half-
animal creatures such as the 33,000 year old 'lion man' from Hohlenstein Stadl,
Germany) which reveals a crosstalk between the social and biological worlds. In
The prehistory of the mind the medieval cathedral analogy seeks to unify two
hitherto unrelated facts about human cognition in a single explanatory frame-
work: the fact that earlier hominids did not possess specialized, standardized tools,
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and the propensity of cognitively modern humans to frequently cross ontological
boundaries in their reasoning. In both cases, authors have probed the evolution-
ary origins of the mind using distant analogies for epistemic purposes. Interest-
ingly, none of these models apply analogies from psychology; rather they draw
from heterogeneous domains, notably artifacts and architectural history. Note
that such explorations of conceptual space are not always successful: in 1976,
Dawkins coined the term 'meme' in analogy with 'gene' as a means to study
cultural transmission. However,current models of cultural evolution have not taken
up this notion of replicating autonomous units of culture.
CONCLUSION
Wehave argued that scientific creativity draws on the same cognitive resources
as other types of creativity: existing conceptual structures constrain scientists in
their creative process. As a consequence, scientific creativity mostly works with
small incremental steps, rather than revolutionary leaps. An important class of
conceptual structures are intuitive ontologies, which guide our thinking about
physical, psychological and biological phenomena. As experimental studies and
the history of science reveal, they sometimes impede scientific progress. To over-
come these cognitive limitations, scientists can apply distant analogies in which
the ontologies of source and target domains differ widely. By presenting prob-
lems in terms of a different ontological category (e.g., the phrasing of organic
functions in mechanical rather than biological terms), scientists can overcome
their intuitive assumptions (e.g., vitalism) and offer solutions that are not pos-
sible in the original conceptual space. This is especially useful in the early stages
of scientific creativity, when intuitive ontologies still play an important part, and
in poorly understood fields of inquiry.
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